According to preliminary findings of the IDF’s investigation, the unit struck by an explosive device Friday morning in Bani Suheila, in southern Gaza, had entered a booby-trapped building.
The structure had been flagged on IDF maps as a suspected hazard. The structure had been flagged on military maps as a potential threat. Troops proceeded with caution and spotted an object resembling a barrel, which they believed to be the explosive. The IDF said the barrel was located on the first or second floor of the multi-story building.
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Staff Sgt. Yoav Raver, Sgt. Major (res.) Chen Gross, Sgt. Uri Yhonatan Cohen and Sgt. First Class Tom Rotstein
(Photo: IDF)
The unit followed protocol and believed it had neutralized the threat. However, the explosives planted by Hamas were located on an upper floor, possibly hidden in a more sophisticated manner. It remains unclear whether the barrel was deliberately placed on a lower level to mislead the troops. The outcome was tragic: Sgt. Major (res.) Chen Gross, Staff Sgt. Yoav Raver, Sgt. First Class Tom Rotstein and Sgt. Uri Yhonatan Cohen were killed in the blast.
The details underscore the magnitude of the challenge facing the IDF in the Gaza Strip. Incidents of gunfire and sniper attacks have decreased, but Hamas made extensive investments during the previous ceasefire and, since its end, has exploited unexploded Israeli ordnance across the enclave to rig roads and buildings with explosives.
On the supply route where three Givati Brigade soldiers were killed last Monday, a corridor known for steady military traffic, intelligence had flagged the potential presence of explosives several months earlier. The IDF said the warning was investigated and ruled out.
Following the explosion, the military conducted an internal review to determine whether this was the same device. The preliminary conclusion is that it was likely a new explosive. According to officers, it was detonated by a terrorist who emerged from a tunnel shaft, carried out the attack and retreated underground.
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Staff Sgt. Omer Van Gelder, Staff Sgt. Lior Steinberg and Staff Sgt. Ofek Barhana
(Photo: IDF)
Conversations with reservists reveal a deepening sense of exhaustion and strain after more than 600 days of fighting in Gaza, even as their belief in the justice of the war remains resolute.
Far from anecdotal, this sentiment is supported by data. A recent survey found that reservists are more opposed to ending the war than the general public—a stance that reflects the personal sacrifices they have made. Still, beneath that conviction lies a growing fatigue, mounting manpower shortages and operational mishaps.
“There’s a routine forming. It’s like Vietnam,” one officer said. “You’re supposed to stay hyper-alert all the time, but the fear of IEDs means you need to work slowly, carefully, with full attention. After more than a year and a half of this, broken up by home leave, it’s easy to miss something.”
In the wake of the last two deadly incidents, a shaken officer delivered an emotional message. “This is burnout. Entire brigades are worn down,” he said. “Go see the front-line command posts for yourself. Sit there for half a day. See what it’s like. How can anyone keep going? I have a soldier with a sensitive medical condition. He already paid a price. I told him to go home. He said, ‘If I’m not here, who replaces me?’ He’s doing life-saving work. And there’s no one else.
IDF strike on terrorist command center in Jabaliya, Gaza
(Video: IDF)
“We’re 600 days into this war. Everyone wants to do their best, to take responsibility, to stay at their posts. But how long can they keep going? People are dying not only because of the enemy or the price of war, which everyone’s willing to pay, but also because of the toll of unbearable exhaustion. People are worn out.”
He continued: “After 600 days on and off, you’re effectively an employee of the state under emergency call-up orders, with a few short breaks. And that’s costing us lives. You can’t blame someone who’s worn down, who makes mistakes, who sinks into routine and overload, who misses warning signs. That’s the reality now.”
Then, the officer turned to the domestic debate over military conscription and the ultra-Orthodox community. “And then I hear about the Haredim,” he said, referring to the ultra-Orthodox. “It’s crazy. Everyone talks about ‘sharing the burden.’ It’s not just a slogan. We need more soldiers to rotate in—people with a pulse. I don’t care who they are, as long as they’re fresh. If they had brought in more people a year and a half ago, my situation today would be completely different.”
The officer’s remarks echo the stance of IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, who has strongly supported expanding the military draft. Officials say his position is not driven by politics or image, but by necessity: the army is in urgent need of manpower.
Among the populations with high reservist turnout is the religious Zionist community. One secular infantryman from the Tel Aviv area noted, “The presence of the kippah-wearers is extraordinary. They’re still showing up, while others have significantly cut back. It’s out of proportion. We owe them a huge debt.”
The IDF’s operational approach in Gaza is shifting—not in its objectives, which remain unchanged, but in the military’s conduct on the ground. Zamir has ordered a slower, more cautious pace to minimize casualties among soldiers and avoid endangering hostages.
This measured approach also serves other purposes: it maintains pressure on Hamas while preserving the possibility of a hostage deal, and it holds off hardliners in the Cabinet, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who are pushing for a rapid escalation.
'We have a strategy to bring Hamas to collapse'
“At the current pace, which is very deliberate,” a senior defense official said, “it will take months to achieve the limited objectives of the operation,” which include clearing the Gaza Strip of Hamas military presence, with the exception of areas where hostages are believed to be held and the designated humanitarian zone in al-Mawasi.
In Gaza City alone, there are currently hundreds of thousands, possibly up to a million, civilians concentrated among densely packed high-rise buildings. How the military plans to handle the remaining enclaves remains unclear.
“Beyond the current phase, to go further would require a Cabinet decision to advance,” the official said. “And that would carry a high risk of hostages being killed.”
This statement underlines that earlier political declarations, promising a new phase and rapid gains, were misleading. Likewise, official references to the number of divisions operating in Gaza may be deceptive; the key question is not how many units are deployed, but how many combat troops are actually in the field.
“Make no mistake,” a prominent IDF officer told me. “Politics aside, we believe we have a strategy to bring Hamas to collapse. That’s what we’re working toward.”
Still, a senior defense official offered a more cautious assessment. “Hamas is not in good shape, but it’s far from collapsing,” he said. “It’s lost part of its food revenue stream due to the establishment of aid centers and distribution networks, which it’s now actively targeting—with disinformation campaigns, gunfire and more. The loss of income has seriously affected its ability to pay salaries, which is significant. But we’re not seeing disintegration, and certainly not panic. The organization hasn’t fractured into splinter groups.”
Despite the loss of many senior commanders, Hamas continues to operate in an organized manner, the official added. “They’re encouraged by the international response and by every successful attack they carry out. They are still functioning in a structured way. Could a collapse happen? Yes. These things can unravel quickly. But our assessment is that it will take time.”
That view stands in stark contrast to the early victory claims made by the Israeli government when food distribution efforts began.